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China had experienced long-term economic growth since the reform in 1978.
With the communism system shifts in the socialist market economy, the
country's legal institution and administration are facing corruption's challenge.
President Xi Jinping takes action against deep corruption in China after coming
to power in 2013. To observe the impact of the second stage of the anticorruption campaign on provincial economic development since the Fifth
Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of
China in 2015 to the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China
in 2017, this project downloads and extracts public records from the National
Supervision Committee of the People ’s Republic of China and the Disciplinary
Inspection Committee of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of
China, combining public information to build anti-corruption effect variables.
Data are distributed from 2015.10 to 2017.12. This project will use a panel data
model to examine the impact of China's anti-corruption movement on provincial
economic growth rate.

1.Introduction

Corruption is a serious threat to political stability, society, economic order and market
freedom in any country. After the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of
China at the end of 2012, the newly elected party’s general secretary Xi Jinping took
the new leadership of the CPC Central Committee to punish political corruption. The
Central Commission for Discipline Inspection has continuously conducted
investigations on several high-level party and government leaders, generals of the
People's Liberation Army, and CEOs of state-owned enterprises and institutions. The
courts have investigated leaders and cadres of the Communist Party of China who
have violated the law. The anti-corruption campaigns since the 18th National
Congress of the Communist Party of China have reached unprecedented depths in
Peoples Republics’ history. After the Fifth Plenary Session of the 18th Central
Committee of the Communist Party of China in 2015, anti-corruption actions have
increasingly expanded to the international level. After 2017, the 19th National
Congress of the CPC formed a normalized anti-corruption system. Since President Xi
Jinping came to power, the party's work style has increasingly attached the attention
in China. The strengthening of anti-corruption actions is conducive to the integrity of
the government and the stability of governing power. However, considering that
China's GDP growth has slowed down in recent years, will anti-corruption disrupt the
existing balance in the short term and affect the regional economy? Any significant
impact of growth?

Many researchers’ studies have shown the effect of corruption on economic growth.
Corruption is harmful to the long-term economic growth and may have a positive effect
in the short term, but there are quite a few studies on the short-term impact of anticorruption campaigns on the economy. Many researchers attribute it to the political
system, but corruption influences economic activities. Since the reform for more than
three decades, China's economy has rapid growth since the political reform in 1979.
The communist institution used to be centralized, so the legal system is under
developing. Local government officials have more power than before because of the
reform. They are tended to rent-seeking, and corruption of officials became quite
common in China.

This paper collected seasonal panel data from 31 provinces and cities in China from
October 2015 to December 2017 and used the panel data model to explore the impact
of the anti-corruption campaign on provincial economic growth rate. There are two
major problems: 1. What kind of impact will the corruption incident investigated by the
Central Discipline Inspection Commission have on the regional economy in the second
round of anti-corruption campaigns? 2. What kind of mechanism does anti-corruption
movement affect the economic growth rate? Further, will the areas of different abilities
of government management be affected differently by anti-corruption campaigns? I will
use STATA for regression analysis and verify the reliability of its results.

2，Literature Review

Huntington (1968) found that during the period of political modernization, that is, the
transition from dictatorship to democracy, corruption increased rapidly, and then with
the improvement of the institutions, corruption would decrease again. In China, people
can generally feel that in the early stage of reform, corruption was very serious, and the
government's anti-corruption efforts were not great. However, the Chinese
government's anti-corruption efforts have increased significantly in recent years.

Although researchers have pointed out that under the condition of imperfect institutions,
some corrupt activities have the function of allocating resources (Aidt, 2003), many
research studies have a micro perspective to discuss corruption’s formation and
mechanism. It did not discuss how the anti-corruption process will affect economic
growth. Most research on corruption and growth is based on empirical analysis (Mauro,
1995).

Other researchers did previous research on personal ties between those corrupt officials
who have been caught during the first-stage Anti-Corruption Campaign in 2012-2015
(Peter, Lu,2018). Their research provides different ways to evaluate two competing
interpretations of Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaigns. One explanation is that this
was an attempt by a party within the Chinese Communist Party to cover up and
eliminate the network of political competitors’ clique. It undermines the pragmatic

governance of some political elites. Another explanation is that Xi Jinping's suppression
has implemented the CCP's improved governance structure like the communism
institutions in the past decades. Corruption behaviours of those officials, especially the
party members, have reduced people's support and far away from the policy goals.
Local governments tend to have higher prosecution rates, and the largest network of
prosecuted officials does not surround most of Xi Jinping's competitors for party leaders.
China cannot rely on globalization and open economic policies to easily gain benefits
forever; it is necessary for government internal policy reform and opening.

2.1 Definition of Corruption

Corruption arises from a privilege. There are many problems with corruption behaviour.
The first is how corruption is measured. All corrupt activities cannot be fully detected,
and the secondary effects of corrupt activities are difficult to observe. The second is the
definition of corruption, where inconsistencies in laws between countries do certain
acts that would be defined as corruption legal in different countries. Instrumental
variables are appropriate to measure corruption and its causal relationship to economic
growth. The instrumental variable uses an external variable to measure the change in
the dependent variable, which then causes a change in the primary dependent
variable(Mauro,1995). In developing countries, corruption is generally related to
regulation, while in countries with economies in transition, the extensive participation
of governments officials in economic activities (including economic regulation) creates

more corruption activities rather than the old planned economic system. Because
corruption is related to privileges in the market, the construction of markets and the
elimination of privileges are important means of beating corruption.

Corruption could be defined as "the act of public power used to pursue personal
interests in a way that violates the rules" (Jain, 2001). According to this definition, there
are three important conditions of the corruption: (1) government officials have the
authority to design and formulate regulatory policies at will; (2) the arbitrariness of
power makes rent-seeking activities possible; (3) Within the political, management, and
legal systems, government officials have incentives to use power to rent-seeking (Aidt,
2003).

There are two main types of corruption: extrajudicial transactions and rent-seeking.
Rent-seeking behaviour exists mainly in the context of market competition. When
competition in developing markets is inadequate, individuals in power may engage in
rent-seeking behaviour. However, the rent-seeking behaviour of non-governmental
officials is complex and difficult to define as corruption. Extra-legal transactions occur
in cases where the law is imperfect, and acts that can be morally judged to be corrupt
cannot be considered illegal because they are not covered by the law. In the absence of
a sound legal system, corrupt activities are not necessarily illegal in the legal sense. For
example, gifts and bribes accepted by government officials are concepts that are
difficult to distinguish in the legal sense.

2.2 Effective Corruption

Corrupt activities do not always have a bad effect, and sometimes they tend to have a
certain resource allocation function, which is called effective corruption. Since markets
and laws do not always work perfectly to achieve an efficient allocation of resources,
corruption often becomes an alternative mechanism. It is clear that this alternative
mechanism is not an optimal one, in which parties involved in market activities compete
for scarce resources, and the efficiency achieved through this mechanism may be higher
than through other mechanisms. This idea was formalized in the "queuing model" (Lui,
1985) and the "auction model" (Beck and Maher, 1986). In the queuing model, different
people have different evaluations of the resources that need to be obtained through
queuing, and the bribes collected by a bureaucrat reveal the resource appraisers'
evaluation of the resources. This achieves effective resource allocation. At the same
time, the bureaucrat does not slow down the queue, because doing so will cause some
people to drop out of the queue, thereby reducing the total number of bribes. The
"Auction Model" further pointed out that the essential difference between market
competition and bribery is not the result of resource allocation, because the same people
who have a high evaluation of resources get the resources, but it is the initial ownership
of resources under market competition. The buyer gets the bid of the buyer, and under
the bribery mechanism, the bureaucrat who has the privilege obtains the bribe. Shleifer
and Vishny (1994) studied the impact of bribery on resource allocation in the presence
of government regulation of enterprises. They believe that bribery is a mechanism for

the distribution of benefits between politicians and businesses. Without a bribery
mechanism, politicians may pursue goals that run counter to corporate interests through
regulation. For example, politicians can require companies to hire too many employees
to win support from more voters. In the case of a bribery mechanism, politicians may
work with the enterprise to maximize the benefits of the enterprise and then share the
benefits of the enterprise. At this time, bribery is a mechanism that allows companies
to redeem inefficient results caused by politicians in other ways, thereby improving
Increased corporate efficiency. Unless the goals of the politician and the enterprise
exactly reflect the goals of social welfare, the results achieved under the bribery
mechanism can only be non-socially optimal.

2.3 Path Dependence

Although effective corruption can improve the efficiency of resource allocation under
certain conditions, it is detrimental to social equity and justice. In the "queuing model"
and "auction model", although the resource allocation is given to the person who has
the highest evaluation of the resource since the resources held by the government are
often public resources, the benefits of these resources should not be obtained by the
bureaucrats who allocate them. In addition, corrupt activities need to be conducted in
secret, the transaction cost is high, and they themselves consume a lot of resources. If
corruption becomes a system, path dependence will be generated, making the whole
society corrupt and out of control (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). We cannot rule out the

possibility that corruption is in line with social justice as an illegal act when the law is
"evil law", nor can we rule out that the current standard of public justice is "evil".
Corruption may be this possibility of "goodness." To say that corruption undermines
fairness and justice is based on simple ethics. But regardless of whether corruption itself
is "evil" or not, if people regard it as "evil", corruption will bring negative effects to
people, which is equivalent to our later model. There are three reasons for the path
dependence of corruption: (1) when corruption is widespread in society. It is more
difficult to monitor corruption (Lui, 1986; Cadot, 1987; Andvig and Moene, 1990);
After the corrupt elements have had relationships with enough corrupt elements, he
tends to have relations with other corrupt elements and continue to corrupt(Aidt,2003);
(3) In a society where most people seek rent and accept bribes, corruption is more
important than businesses Home has higher returns (Murphy et al., 1991, 1993;
Acemoglu, 1995).

Although some corrupt activities have a role in allocating resources, this positive effect
is not enough. Generally speaking, corruption is bad for investment and economic
growth (Mauro, 1995, 1998; Wei, 2000; Paldam, 2002), has a negative impact on
income distribution (Rose-Ackerman, 1978), and also increases the size of the informal
economy (Friedman et al., 2000; Murphy et al., 1993), Reducing human capital
accumulation, urbanization, financial deepening and international trade.

2.4 Government ‘s Role

The government's goal is to be that the government does not regard public welfare
social welfare goals as its goal, and the other may be that the government pursues social
welfare. When the government is not pursuing social welfare, political changes (such
as democratization and decentralization of public services) are prerequisites for anticorruption (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Ferejohn, 1986; Aidt and Dutta, 2001; Persson
et al. , 1997), and to prevent governments from being dominated by special interest
claims (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). In economic research, the starting point of an
analysis is how to plan the anti-corruption path when the government's goal is social
benefits. This problem is also true for countries that transform government goals into
social welfare through political change. Under the assumption of a benevolent
government, the control of institutions and the punishment of laws are generally
considered to be an important means of combating corruption. In terms of system
control, if increased supervision is achieved by investing more manpower, then if the
supervisors themselves are prone to corruption, the result of increased supervision may
be an increase in the total amount of corruption in the society rather than a decrease
(Laffont and Guessan, 1999). In terms of legal punishment, the design of the
punishment system is very important. If the punishment is mistakenly set as a concave
function of the number of bribes, it may encourage people to corruption instead of
inhibiting the occurrence of corrupt activities. In fact, if the problem of system design
has been solved, corruption may not be eliminated, because from an economic point of

view, at a specific point in time, anti-corruption is as much a social cost and a social
benefit as a crime. As a result of the trade-off, the costs that the government needs to
consider the cost of fighting against corruption and the cost of motivating government
officials to abandon corrupt activities under asymmetric information conditions (Aidt,
2003). If the government wants to further control corruption, it can only be achieved
under two conditions: one is that the "technology" of anti-corruption has changed, for
example, the openness of information has improved, or the legal system has been
improved, making the cost of anti-corruption. Another condition is that the way of
resource allocation has changed. For example, the construction of the market allows
economic resources to be allocated more with the help of market mechanisms, and the
function of resource allocation for corrupt activities is becoming more and more
important for the entire society. Less important; currently, anti-corruption does not
necessarily affect the sustainable economic growth.

Legal construction and market construction are two important ways to combat
corruption. Legal construction can effectively reduce the cost of anti-corruption, while
market construction can change the way resources are allocated, making the resource
allocation function of corrupt activities more efficient. The nature of anti-corruption
varies in different transition economies. In Russia, the economic transformation was
achieved in a radical way. The problem there was a lack of an effective definition of
private property rights, which led to corruption (Varese, 1997), so the primary task of
anti-corruption was to build a legal system.

3. Data and Results

3.1 Data

Province
Shanghai
Yunnan
Neimenggu
Beijing
Jilin
Sichuan
Tianjing
Ningxia
Anhui
Shandong
Shanxi
Guangdong
Guangxi
Xinjiang
Jiangsu
Jiangxi
Hebei
Henan
Zhejiang
Hainan
Hubei
Hunan
Gansu
Fujian
Xizang
Guizhou
Liaoning
Chongqing
Shaanxi
Qinghai
Heilongjiang

Amount
3
5
15
2
9
8
14
7
16
15
12
41
19
21
9
8
43
4
1
7
22
30
7
10
2
7
31
14
12
2
12

Percentage(%)
0.74
1.23
5.64
0.49
2.21
1.96
3.43
1.72
3.92
3.68
2.94
10.05
4.66
5.15
2.21
1.96
10.54
0.98
0.25
1.72
5.39
7.35
1.72
2.45
0.49
1.72
7.60
3.43
2.94
0.49
2.94
Table 3.1

Rank
18
16
9
19
13
14
10
15
8
9
11
2
7
6
13
14
1
17
20
15
5
4
15
12
19
15
3
10
11
19
11

Table 3.1 shows the distribution of corruption officials among 31 provinces from the
4th quarter of 2015 to the 4th quarter of 2017. This paper collected data from the
National Supervision Committee of the People ’s Republic of China and the
Disciplinary Inspection Committee of the Central Committee of the Communist Party
of China for empirical analysis. From 2015 to 2017, NSC and DIC have reported more
than 400 regional investigations. I extracted lists from NSC and DIC data and collected
data in conjunction with the public records of local judicial agencies. Each corruption
case record in my data set includes name, administrative level, academic qualifications,
amount of corruption, trial status, investigation time, and region belonging. The data
set includes 11 categories and 478 corrupt officials reviewed. Also, I gathered panel
data samples, including Mainland China‘s provincial growth data from the 4th quarter
of 2015 to the 4th quarter of 2017.

Figure 3.1

Figure 3.1 indicates that there are 478 province-level corrupt officials in 31 provinces
and cities from 2015.10 to 2017.12. It can be seen that there are huge differences in
different regions. It is obvious that there is no significant regional gathering.

3.2 Analytical Model
I use the pronounce judgment’s amount of the corrupt provincial officials as a measure
of the degree of anti-corruption and explored whether the impact was cumulative and
long-term during the sample period based on the short-term impact. Panel data samples
from the fourth quarter of 2015 to the fourth quarter of 2017. There are many factors
that influence economic growth. According to the Solow growth model, per capita
wealth and savings rate affects the rate of economic growth, control variables use the
log of income per capita.
The basic model is constructed as follows:

Ygdpr_it, the dependent variable, is the seasonal GDP growth rate of each province.
Cor_it is the number of corrupt officials in the province in a quarter, which is an
independent variable.
ln yit is the log income per capita in RMB at the current quarter.
γt is a seasonal fixed effect that controls common factors that affect the economic
growth of each province at the same time.

δi is a province fixed effect that controls those effects that do not change over time,
such as the provincial economy factors of growth, such as geographic features.
ξit is the error term.

There are technical differences between provinces, and the easier it is for backward
provinces to learn and imitate advanced provinces to improve their production
efficiency and narrow the gap, the economic growth rate of backward provinces will be
higher, so I control this factor through the quarterly time fixed effect. Also, due to the
strict residency policy, the migration and the local tax collecting is really stable (Chan
and Li, 1999) so the effect of migration is not significant. Because the analysis uses
quarterly data, the influence of anti-corruption campaign to economic growth may have
time-sequence, put a Cor it-1 (the amount record of corrupt officials lagged a season)
can solve this problem.

3.3. Analysis Results

This paper uses a fixed effect to analyze the panel data model while controlling the
related time and regional differences. This project is using STATA to perform a
regression analysis on the fixed effect model. The control variable is selected according
to the Solow growth model. The log of income per capita is used to examine the impact
of the anti-corruption campaign on provincial economic growth rate. At the same time,
on the basis of the original model, a lagged variable of the number of corrupt officials
was added to the model to investigate the impact of the anti-corruption campaign on

local economic growth, and the cross-section regression analysis of the cumulative
effect of officials' falling was conducted during the sample period. In order to ensure
the reliability of the regression analysis results, this paper will also perform endogenous
tests. This section explores the duration of the impact and further analyzes whether the
impact is cumulative and long-term during the sample period.

YGdpr_it

Mean

Sd.

7.531

1.911

1.573

8.631

Min.

Max.

Obs

-2.5

11

279

2.216

0

13

279

0.353

7.802

9.670

279

(Provincial GDP
growth rate year by
year, %)

Cor_it
(Number of corrupt
officials been
investigated)

ln y_it
(Log income per
capita, RMB)

Table 3.2

Table 3.2 is descriptive Statistics of main variables. YGdpr_it is the quarterly growth
rate year by year, the average is 7.5%. ln yit is the ln income per capita in RMB current
quarter. Number of observations for 31 provincial administrative units in China over
nine quarters.

YGdpr_it
Cor_it

(1)

(2)

-0.136**

-0.005

(0.068)

(0.028)

(3)

(4)

(5)

-0.021

-0.030

-0.021

(0.029)

(0.036)

(0.029)

lny_it-1

-0.872
(0.561)

lny_it-4

0.043
(0.499)

Constant

7.746***

7.539***

8.035***

14.938***

7.670**

(0.137)

(0.069)

(0.175)

(4.839)

(4.261)

Region fixed

N

Y

Y

Y

Y

Time fixed

N

N

Y

Y

Y

Obs

279

279

279

248

279

R-squared

0.025

0.0249

0.062

0.040

0.062

Table 3.3 Brackets are standard errors, ***/**/* represent significance level at 1%,
5% and 10%

Table 3.3 is basic regression. The first column uses POOL regression, which does not
control both provincial and time fixed effects. The coefficient of corrupt officials in the
first column is -0.136, which is significant at the 10% level. The second column controls
the provincial fixed effects. The coefficient of corrupt officials is -0.005, which is not
significant. The third column controls both provincial and time fixed effects; the
coefficient of corrupt officials is -0.021, which is not significant. First to the third
column shows that the short-term growth has been affected by fallen corrupt officials,
although the effect is limited. The fourth column added the lagged log of the income
per capita as the control variable. The coefficient of corrupt officials is -0.030, which
is not significant. The fifth column changed the control variable to the log of last year’s
income per capita. The coefficient of the corrupt officials is -0.021, which is still not

significant. The fourth and fifth column shows that marginal impact to the short-term
growth is not significant, which means the anti-corruption campaign did less effect on
provincial economic growth even the provincial level leaders has been announced that
they have illegal corruption cases.

YGdpr_it
Cor_it

(1)

(2)

-0.027

-0.033

(0.035)

(0.035)

Cor_it-1

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)
-0.049
(0.034)

-0.047
(0.034)

Cor_it-2

-0.059*
(0.035)

Cor_it-3

-0.052

-0.052

-0.051

(0.032)

(0.032)

(0.032)

lny_it-1

Constant

-0.878

-0.851

-0.829

-0.817

-1.212*

(0.559)

(0.556)

(0.554)

(0.555)

(0.644)

7.476***

15.137***

14.831***

14.628***

14.539***

18.705***

(0.194)

(4.820)

(4.793)

(4.775)

(4.776)

(5.918)

Region fixed

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

Time fixed

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

Obs

248

248

248

248

248

31

R-squared

0.041

0.052

0.045

0.049

0.041

0.148

Table 3.4

Brackets are standard errors, ***/**/* represent significance level at 1%,

5% and 10%

Table 3.4 is going to test if there is a continuous effect on the growth rate. The first
column added the last quarter’s corrupt officials as the control variable, also controls
both the provincial and time fixed effects, the second column added original control
variable the log income per capita in RMB at last quarter. The coefficient of Cor_it-1
and Cor_it-3 is not significant, which means there is no significant dynamic delayed

effect; the limited effect to economic growth would appear in the current quarter.
Column 3 to 5 has different Cor_its, Column 3 is Corit-1 month, column 4 is Corit-2
months, and column 5 is Corit-3 months. The coefficient of the different time’s corrupt
officials in column 3-5 is not significant, which means there is no significant delayed
effect and the effect duration is short.

Column 6 is the cross-section regression of two years' data. We can see that it is still
not significant. So, the effect of the anti-corruption campaign is limited by short-term.

Cor_it
YGdpr_it

(1)

(2)

(3)

-1.376

-1.437

-1.769

(1.032)

(1.194)

(1.363)

-1.848

-2.031

-3.181

(6.438)

(6.556)

(6.731)

43.074

45.906

61.249

(65.484)

(67.73)

(71.308)

Obs

31

31

R-squared

0.044

0.040

lny_it

Constant

Table 3.5
Table 3.5 is the endogeneity test of the past years’ data to see if there is any relationship
between the officials and the past growth. In this test, the dependent variable is the
number of corrupt officials of 2 years.
In column 1, independent variables are 2015’s average lnyit and YGdprit
In column 2, independent variables are 2014-2015’s average lnyit and 2014’s YGdprit
In column 3, independent variables are 2013-2015’s average lnyit and 2013’s YGdprit
The results are not significant at any level. Past three year's growth cannot predict the
number of Corrupt officials after 2015. The amount of Corrupt officials is exogenous.

31
0.048

4, Conclusion

In the theoretical section, the paper describes the causes and effects of corruption and
the basis of the anti-corruption campaign in China. The empirical part collected
seasonal panel data from 31 provinces and cities in China from October 2015 to
December 2017. It used the panel data model to explore the impact of the anticorruption campaign on provincial economic growth rate.

The Anti-Corruption Campaign has a short-term negative effect on the provincial GDP
growth rate, and there is no remarkable delayed effect in month/quarter scale. The
negative effect on provincial growth may only last a few weeks. The negative impact
of the anti-corruption campaign on short-term economic growth may be due to the
replacement of corrupt officials. However, this negative impact is not significant and is
acceptable.

After arguing that an increase in corruption cases would have a limited adverse effect
on economic growth, there was no negative effect on long-term economic growth over
the sample period. This limited negative perception was demonstrated to be nonlagging and continuous by changing the method of calculation of corruption cases. The
anti-corruption campaign is not significantly affected the long-term GDP growth rate,

and there is no remarkable delayed effect. That means the anti-corruption campaign is
essential.

The homogeneity of the number of corrupt officials shows that the centre of the party
does not generally adjust the intensity of the anti-corruption campaign to local
economic growth. The anti-corruption movement seems like based on specific rules,
whether it enhanced central power or the political modernization.
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